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PUBLIC WRONGS, PRIVATE RIGHTS: PRIVATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
GILBERT PAUL CARRASCOt
I. INTRODUCTION
D RESIDENT Clinton, in his second inaugural address, espoused
the views of both liberals and conservatives alike when he stated
that it was time for the American people to be given more power
while the federal government downsizes. 1 One way to empower the
American people is to recognize rights of action that enable the
American people to act as "private attorneys general" for the en-
forcement of the civil rights laws.2 The federal government's role is
important, but, in many instances, the beneficiaries of the laws will
be denied their rights if they are required to rely on the machinery
of a federal agency for redress. 3
t Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law (on leave, 1998-1999;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law); LL.M., Ge-
orgetown University Graduate School of Law;J.D., University of Santa Clara School
of Law; B.A., University of San Diego; Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants/Respon-
dents in Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living. Professor Carrasco suc-
cessfully argued the appeal in the Third Circuit. My thanks to my research
assistants, Gregory M. Thomas (Villanova), Laura Ann Underwood, and Dea N.
Wolfe (Willamette).
1. See Michael K_ Frisby & Hilary Stout, Clinton Espouses Smaller Government,
Bipartisanship, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1997, at A20. Specifically, President Clinton
made the following comments during his inaugural address:
Today we can declare: Government is not the problem, and government
is not the solution. We, the American people, we are the solution ....
We need a new government for a new century, a government humble
enough not to try to solve all of our problems for us, but strong enough
to give us the tools to solve our problems for ourselves.
Id.
2. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (permit-
ting prevailing plaintiff under Title II to collect attorneys' fees and observing that,
if the plaintiff "obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority").
3. "The sluggishness of government, the multitude of matters that clamor for
attention, and the relative ease with which men are persuaded to postpone troub-
lesome decisions, all make inertia one of the most decisive powers in determining
the course of our affairs and frequently gives to the established order of things a
longevity and vitality much beyond its merits." Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S.
390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
(321)
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A current example of this phenomenon is in the area of envi-
ronmental justice.4 In light of the lack of enforcement by the fed-
eral government of environmental and civil rights laws in
communities of color, it has become increasingly necessary for pri-
vate individuals and organizations to enlist in the war against envi-
ronmental racism. 5 Indeed, augmentation of the enforcement
effort is welcomed by the federal government.6 In fact, in Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seifl the United States filed
an amicus brief arguing that the regulations of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) can be enforced by private attorneys
general. 8
The Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended
several civil rights statutes to be enforceable by private parties.9 In-
controvertibly, federal agencies do not have the resources and can-
not be expected to remedy every violation of civil rights in the
United States. As a result, private attorneys general may be neces-
sary to remedy civil rights violations in the United States.
The critical question explored by this Article is whether valid
regulations that implement Title VI can be enforced by private par-
ties.10 Regulations are binding laws, and they are often intended to
4. For a discussion of the issue of public participation in effecting environ-
mental justice, see Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participa-
tion and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 3 (1998).
5. For a discussion of the importance of grassroots activism in this struggle,
see Sheila Foster, Justice from the Grouid Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resist-
ance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L.
REv. 775, 811-26 (1998).
6. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1125).
7. 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug.
17, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
8. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.
1997) (No. 97-1125). The United States argued the following in its brief filed in
Chester:
Because of the inherent limitations on administrative enforcement mech-
anisms and on the litigation resources of the United States, the United
States has an interest in ensuring that both Title VI [of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964] and its implementing regulations may be enforced in federal
court by private parties acting as "private attorneys general." Such private
suits are critical to ensuring optimal enforcement of the mandate of Title
VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and the regulations.
Id.
9. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (holding
Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 includes private right of action "de-
spite the absence of any express authorization for it in the statute").
10. On June 8, 1998, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in response to the
petition in Chester. The rhetorical question presented by the petitioner was
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action in federal court that
bypasses a federal agency's review and enforcement process under section 602 of
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provide additional protection of civil rights. Of course, regulations
are only valid if they are consistent with the purposes underlying
the enabling statute controlling the promulgation of such regula-
tions. If a regulation is ultra vires the statute, it is nugatory.11 Con-
gressional intent is, therefore, of great importance in this context.
The test of whether a private right of action exists to enforce regula-
tions has various permutations that will be explored in this Article.
Nevertheless, the essential syllogism for determining whether a pri-
vate right of action exists is that if regulations are consistent with
congressional intent, and if congressional intent dictates that pri-
vate parties can sue to vindicate civil rights that flow from the en-
abling statute, it follows that private parties may also sue for
vindication of civil rights that emanate from the regulations.
The area of civil rights law in which this issue has emerged with
great importance is "environmental justice," a movement which fo-
cuses on ending environmental racism. Environmental racism has
been defined as the disproportionate placement of waste treatment
facilities in minority communities, the systematic exclusion of peo-
ple of color from environmental planning and the planned destruc-
tion of many traditional communities. 12 Waste treatment facilities
are often placed in minority communities because they pose far less
Tide VI simply by alleging discriminatory effect in the administration of programs
and activities of a federally funded state or local agency. See Seif v. Chester Resi-
dents Concerned for Quality Living, 118 S. Ct. 2296 (1998). The Supreme Court
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on August 17, 1998 based on the
suggestion of mootness filed by the respondents. See Chester, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129
(U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620). The case became moot after the petition for a
writ of certiorari was filed when the Petitioner Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection revoked the waste facility permit that had been the underly-
ing linchpin of the action.
To date, the Supreme Court has not articulated a specific test. Nevertheless, it
has permitted private rights of action to enforce a variety of federal regulations as a
matter of course. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1982); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975) ("Such a conclusion was, of course, entirely consistent with the Court's rec-
ognition in J.I Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), that private enforce-
ment of Commission rules may [provide] a necessary supplement to Commission
action.").
11. See Mouming v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)
(explaining agency's legislative regulations will be upheld if "reasonably related" to
underlying purposes of enabling statute).
12. See Michelle Adams, Separate and Unequal: Housing Choice, Mobility and
Equalization in the Federally-Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. Rv. 413, 486
(1996) (explaining need for group rights and disparity of living conditions for
people living in poor communities). For a discussion of the evolution of the defi-
nitional rubric from "environmental racism" to "environmental equity" to "envi-
ronmental justice," see Robert W. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on
Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity, and Environmentaljustice, 9 J. ENVTL. L.
& LITIG. 121, 125-31 (1994).
1998]
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political obstacles than upper-class or middle-class white communi-
ties. "Environmental racism," therefore, refers to the most nefari-
ous actions of environmental degradation that are intentionally
directed toward communities of color. Proving intentional discrim-
ination, however, is often difficult, if not impossible.13 "Environ-
mental justice" is thus distinguished as a term of art to refer to the
legal redress of actions having discriminatory effects.
Claims for environmental justice have been asserted under a
variety of theories, but the one that is emerging as the most promis-
ing is Title VI. 4 This statute prohibits discrimination in programs
that receive funds from the federal government. Although asser-
tion of rights continues to be problematic under the statute itself
because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, the
Supreme Court has held that regulations that implement Title VI,
which proscribe actions by federally funded programs having "dis-
criminatory effects," are valid.
The question remains, however, whether private parties can
enforce these valid civil rights regulations. If the answer is "yes," a
private party needs to prove "discriminatory effect" to state a prima
facie case against a federal funding recipient. 15 If not, private par-
ties must sue under the statute itself, and thus be subject to the
higher standard of disparate treatment. In other words, the party
must prove intent to discriminate when proceeding pursuant to the
statute.
This Article will examine, through the prism of environmental
justice, whether a private right of action should exist to enforce
valid regulations when the enabling statute already implies a private
right of action. First, Section II will examine Title VI and its imple-
menting regulations. a6 Second, Section III will examine Supreme
13. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977) (holding intentional discrimination, necessary to prove
Fourteenth Amendment violation, may be inferred from evidence concerning his-
torical background of decision at issue, specific sequence of events leading up to
challenged decision, departures from normal procedural sequence or departures
from substantive norms by policymakers).
14. See Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) §§ 601-606, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d-2000d-4a (1994).
15. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 623 n.15 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Proof of the disproportionate racial impact of a pro-
gram or activity is, of course, not the end of the case. Rather a prima facie showing
of discriminatory impact shifts the burden to the recipient of federal funds to
demonstrate a sufficient nondiscriminatory justification for the program or activ-
ity." (citing Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1980))).
16. For a discussion of Title VI and its implementing regulations, see infra
notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
4
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Court jurisprudence concerning this issue.' 7 Third, Section IV will
analyze the differing approaches used by the United States Courts
of Appeals to determine whether a preferred approach currently
exists.18 Finally, Section V will conclude with the proposition that
private rights of action should be recognized to enforce regulations
promulgated pursuant to privately enforceable civil rights
statutes.19
II. THE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF TITLE VI
The first step in analyzing a regulation is to look to the words
of the governing statute that confers power on the governmental
agency to regulate. Title VI directs agencies to promulgate regula-
tions to carry out the objectives of the statute. Section 601, the sub-
stantive component of Title VI, provides that "[n] o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 Section 602 of Title VI authorizes
federal agencies that provide financial assistance "to effectuate the
provisions of [section 601] of this title . . . by issuing rules, regula-
tions, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute ... ."2 Once the
17. For a discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the availa-
bility of a private right of action under Title VI, see infra notes 25-36 and accompa-
nying text.
18. For a discussion of federal appellate courts' approaches to the availability
of private fights of action under Tide VI, see infra notes 37-140 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the proposition that private rights of action should be
recognized to enforce regulations promulgated pursuant to privately enforceable
civil fights statutes, see infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
20. Title VI § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
21. Id. § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994). Section 602 of Title VI further pro-
vides that:
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until
approved by the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or re-
fusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to
any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the rec-
ord, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such re-
quirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the
particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom
such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the
particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has
been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law ....
Id. Section 602 also dictates that an agency may not affect rights under section 601
until the agency has provided appropriate notice to a recipient regarding its fail-
ure to comply with statutory requirements. See id.
1998]
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statute has been examined, the regulations themselves can be ex-
amined. Most agencies have implemented Title VI by issuing regu-
lations that incorporate a discriminatory effect standard of proof,
referred to as disparate impact. This standard of proof is much eas-
ier to meet than discriminatory intent, the standard used by Title VI
itself. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has promulgated the following regulation pursuant to section 602
of Tide VI:
A recipient[ 22] [of federal financial assistance] shall not
use criteria or methods of administering its program
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimina-
tion because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or
have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing ac-
complishment of the objectives of the program with re-
spect to individuals of a particular race, color, national
origin, or sex. 23
In addition, EPA requires applicants seeking federal assistance to
submit statements with their applications assuring EPA that they
will comply with these non-discrimination provisions. 24 It is regula-
tions such as these that private attorneys general may use for the
enforcement of civil rights.
III. THE SUPREME COURT TITLE VI JURISPRUDENCE
A. Disparate Impact Regulations Are Valid
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that regulations promul-
gated pursuant to Title VI that have an "effects" standard are valid.
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, Justice White an-
nounced the judgment of the Court. He and the four justices who
dissented from the judgment of the Court concluded that disparate
22. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.25 (1997) ("Recipient means, for the purposes of this regu-
lation, any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or its
political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or
other entity, or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended di-
rectly or through another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or trans-
feree of a recipient, but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.").
23. Id. § 7.35(b) (emphasis added).
24. See id. § 7.80(a). Specifically, EPA requires the following: Applicants for
EPA assistance [must] submit an assurance with their applications stating that, with
respect to their programs or activities that receive EPA assistance, they will comply
with the requirements of this part. Id. "EPA assistance [means] any grant or coop-
erative agreement, loan, contract . . . or any other arrangement by which EPA
provides or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of ... [flunds .. .
Id. § 5.3 (b)(iii).
6
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impact regulations that implement Title VI are valid.25 The four
justices who concurred in the judgment with Justice White did not
agree that disparate impact regulations that implement Title VI are
valid.26 Justice White and Justice Marshall, who wrote a dissenting
opinion, concluded that discriminatory intent should not be re-
quired under Title VI, the statute itself, and that the regulations
implementing Title VI are valid. 27 In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, reasoned that
although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent, the
administrative regulations incorporating a disparate impact stan-
dard are valid. 28
The Supreme Court confirmed and clarified the holding of
Guardians in Alexander v. Choate.29 In Alexander, Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous Court, explained Guardians by stating "the
Court held that actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed
to implement the purposes of Title VI." 30 Therefore, based on the
Court's definitive decisions in Guardians and Alexander, regulations
prohibiting federal funding recipients from administering pro-
grams that have a discriminatory effect based on race are clearly
valid and consistent with Title VI.
B. Title VI Can Be Enforced by an Implied Private Right of
Action
Analogous to the Supreme Court decision in Guardians, Can-
non v. University of Chicago held that an implied cause of action ex-
ists under Title IX.3 1 Guardians, citing Cannon, stated that "[a]
25. 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2 (1983).
26. See id. at 607-15.
27. See id. at 584 n.2. Justice White, in concluding that it is not necessary to
prove discriminatory intent under Title VI, wrote: "I agree with Justice Marshall
that discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a violation of Title VI."
Id.
28. See id. Justice White, continuing with his belief that administrative regula-
tions incorporating a disparate impact standard are valid, stated: "I also believe
that the regulations are valid, even assuming, arguendo, that Title VI, in and of
itself, does not proscribe disparate-impact discrimination." Id.
29. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
30. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall further characterized the
Court's decision in Guardians, stating that in Guardians "we held that Title VI had
delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what
sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social
problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices
of federal grantees that had produced those impacts." Id. at 293-94.
31. 441 U.S. 677, 702-03 (1979) ("[T]he very persistence - before 1972 and
since, among judges and executive officials, as well as among litigants and their
1998]
7
Carrasco: Public Wrongs, Private Rights: Private Attorneys General for Civi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
328 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 321
major part of the analysis was that Title IX had been derived from
Title VI, that Congress understood that private remedies were avail-
able under Title VI, and that Congress intended similar remedies to
be available under Title IX."32 Applying the four-part test from Cort
v. Ash, 33 Cannon determined whether Title IX, which is modeled
after Title VI, is enforceable by private parties. The Court in Can-
non explained that "[w] e have no doubt that Congress intended to
create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title
VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private
cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination." 34
Thus, in Chester,35 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit observed that "[t] he Supreme Court has now made it unde-
niably clear that Guardians stands for at least two propositions: (1)
a private right of action exists under section 601 of Title VI that
requires plaintiffs to show intentional discrimination; and (2) dis-
criminatory effect regulations promulgated by agencies pursuant to
section 602 are valid exercises of their authority under that
section."36
counsel, and even implicit in decisions of this Court - of the assumption that
both Title VI and Title IX created a private right of action for the victims of illegal
discrimination and the absence of legislative action to change that assumption pro-
vide further evidence that Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms,
that assumption.").
32. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 594 (1983) (White,
J., joined by Rehnquist, J.) (finding "it was the unmistakable thrust of the Cannon
Court's opinion that the congressional view was correct as to the availability of
private actions to enforce Title VI").
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (applying four-part test to evaluate whether Title VI
can be utilized by private parties, and determining that corporation stockholders,
in derivative action, did not have private right of action under Federal Elections
Campaign Act of 1971). The four-part test laid out in Cort for determining
whether a private right of action exists under a statute is as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," ... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintif? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
solely on federal law?
Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
34. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703 (footnote omitted) (holding Title IX implied pri-
vate right of action).
35. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d
Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
36. Id. at 929 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985)).
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IV. FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS: Is THERE AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION TO ENFORCE REGULATIONS PROMULGATED PURSUANT
TO TITLE VI?
A. Background: The Issue in the Appellate Courts
It is clear that an implied private cause of action furthers the
purposes of Title VI. Also, it is clear that disparate impact regula-
tions are consistent with the purposes of Title VI. Yet the question
remains whether an implied private cause of action exists to en-
force those validly promulgated regulations.37 Simple logic suggests
that, because both premises are consistent with the purposes of Ti-
tle VI, it follows that a private cause of action is also available to
enforce Title VI regulations.
This question of first impression was the issue posed to the
Third Circuit in the Chester case.38 There, the Third Circuit recog-
nized an implied private right of action in an EPA regulation
promulgated under Title VI.39 The Third Circuit applied the fol-
lowing three-prong test, as originally articulated in Angelastro v. Pru-
dential-Bache Securities, Inc.,40 to determine whether it is appropriate
to imply private rights of action to enforce regulations:
(1) "[W]hether the agency rule is properly within the
scope of the enabling statute"; (2) "whether the statute
under which the agency rule was promulgated properly
permits the implication of a private right of action"; and
(3) "whether implying a private right of action will further
the purposes of the enabling statute."4
37. In Alexander, Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, made the
following observation:
Guardians... does not support petitioners' blanket proposition that fed-
eral law proscribes only intentional discrimination against the handi-
capped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the
interpretation of § 504, [which is analogous to § 601 of Title VI], Guardi-
ans suggests that the regulations implementing § 504.. . could make actionable
the disparate impact challenged in this case.
469 U.S. at 294 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
38. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 927 ("This appeal presents the purely legal ques-
tion of whether a private right of action exists under discriminatory effect regula-
tions promulgated by federal administrative agencies pursuant to section 602 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
39. See id. (concluding "[w]e agree with the overwhelming number of courts
of appeals that have indicated, with varying degrees of analysis, that a private right
of action exists under section 602 of Title VI and its implementing regulations").
40. 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985).
41. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ange-
lastro, 764 F.2d at 947). Additionally, the Third Circuit observed that a satisfactory
finding that a private right of action does exist is only a precursor to the question
of standing. See id. (assuming private right of action did exist, next step was to
1998] 329
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Recognition of a private right of action under the EPA regulation
is, of course, critical to the substantive question of whether a private
right of action stands under a disparate impact theory.
Disparate impact regulations clearly satisfy the first prong of
the Angelastro test because the Supreme Court has found that these
disparate impact rules are not only "within the scope" of Title VI,
but also that these rules further the purposes of Title VI.42 The
second prong is satisfied because the Court in Cannon specifically
found that, by the time "Title IX was enacted, the critical language
in Title VI had already been construed as creating a private rem-
edy."4 3 In assessing whether the second prong was satisfied, the
Third Circuit considered the four general factors for recognizing
implied statutory rights of action as announced by the Supreme
Court in Cort.44 As to the first Cort factor, whether the plaintiff is
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was en-
acted,"45 the Third Circuit concluded that plaintiffs "clearly" satis-
fied this part of the test.46 The Third Circuit also concluded that
the second Cort factor 47 was satisfied because the legislative history
indicated "an intent to create a private right of action, in satisfac-
tion of the Cort factors."48 The Third Circuit then determined that
"a private right of action [is] consistent with the legislative scheme
of Title VI," thus satisfying the third Cort factor. 49 With respect to
the fourth and final Cort factor, the Third Circuit opined that it "is
"decide... whether a target corporation has standing to bring injunctive relief to
vindicate the rights of shareholders").
42. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1983) (ob-
serving that consistent judicial and administrative interpretations of Title VI al-
lowed implementation of regulations that reach disparate impact discrimination
"without interference by Congress"); see also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 620 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (observing that Congress, with full awareness of how agencies were
interpreting Title VI, modeled later statutes after it, thus indicating approval of
administrative definition).
43. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979) (finding
legislative history included recognition of private right of action under Title VI
and, afortiori, under Title IX).
44. For a discussion of the four Cort factors considered in determining the
availability of an implied statutory right of action, see supra note 33 and accompa-
nying text.
45. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 933
n.10 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-
1620) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
46. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 933 n.10.
47. For a discussion of the Cort factors, see supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
48. Chester, 132 F.3d at 934.
49. Id. at 936.
10
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irrelevant because Title VI is federal law." 50 Thus, in satisfying all
four Cort factors, the Third Circuit determined that the second
prong of the Angelastro test had been established. 51
The Third Circuit held that the third prong of Angelastro was
satisfied by relying on the Court's decision in Cannon, in which the
Court noted that Congress "sought to accomplish two related, but
nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress wanted
to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory prac-
tices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective pro-
tection against those practices."5 2 The Third Circuit reasoned that
allowing private rights of action increases the enforcement of Title
VI, thus furthering the purposes of Title VI, and thereby satisfying
the third prong of the Angelastro test.5 3 Recognizing that all of the
prongs of the Angelastro test were satisfied, the Third Circuit stated
that "we hold that private plaintiffs may maintain an action under
discriminatory effect regulations promulgated by federal adminis-
trative agencies pursuant to section 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964."54
The Third Circuit adopted an analysis similar to that of Cannon
in Chowdhury v. Reading Hospital & Medical Center55 The Third Cir-
cuit in Chowdhury found that, because an agency may appropriately
decide not to investigate based on lack of agency resources rather
than on the basis of its view of the merits of the case, a private right
of action will provide a higher level of enforcement to deter viola-
tions of the law.56 As has been stated, "disparate impacts upon mi-
norities constitute[ ] sufficiently significant social problems, and
[are] readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices
of the federal grantees that ha[ve] produced those impacts. '5 7
50. Id. at 933 n.10.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 936 (relying on Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
704 (1979)). In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court indicated that private
rights of action under Title VI and Title IX do not frustrate legislative purposes.
See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
53. See Chester, 132 F.3d at 936 (explaining dual purposes of Title VI are to:
"(1) combat discrimination by entities who receive federal funds; and (2) provide
citizens with effective protection against discrimination" (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S.
at 704)).
54. Chester, 132 F.3d at 937.
55. 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that plaintiffs need not exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies before filing suit).
56. See id. at 321-22.
57. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985) (characterizing Court's
decision in Guardians as holding that disparate impact regulations implementing
Title VI are valid).
1998]
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It is important to note, however, that before the Third Circuit's
decision in Chester, the district court considered the case, 58 and, in
doing so, misconstrued Chowdhuy. The Chester plaintiffs alleged
that between 1987 and 1996, the Pennsylvania Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection had granted five waste facility permits for
commercial facilities to be located within the City of Chester,
thereby increasing the total permit waste capacity of Chester by
over 2,000,000 tons per year.59 Demographically, Chester is a pre-
dominately African-American city located in Delaware County,
which is a predominately white county.60 In contrast, during this
same time period, only two permits for waste facilities were granted
elsewhere in Delaware County.61 Moreover, the permit capacity of
each of these two waste facilities was only 700 tons per year.62
The district court in Chester held that a private individual has
no private cause of action under the EPA civil rights regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 602.63 The court based its deci-
sion on the Third Circuit's decision in Chowdhury, which stated that
"the complaint procedure adopted by [the agency] does not allow
the complainant to participate in the investigation or subsequent
enforcement proceedings. ' 64  However, this passage from
Chowdhury relates to an administrative funding termination pro-
ceeding, not to federal court litigation. 65
The district court in Chester failed to consider the essence of
the Third Circuit's decision in Chowdhury, which noted that
"'[b] ecause the individual complainants cannot assure themselves
that the administrative process will reach a decision on their com-
plaints within a reasonable time, it makes little sense to require ex-
58. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), va-
cated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
59. See id. at 415 (providing, according to plaintiffs brief, the DELCORA
plant, operating in Chester, "had a permit for a sewage waste facility to treat
44,000,000 gallons of sewage a day and an air quality permit to incinerate 17,500
tons per year of sewage sludge").
60. See id. at 414 (stating that Delaware County's population is 86.5% white
and 11.2% black).
61. See id. at 415.
62. See id.
63. See Chester, 944 F. Supp. at 417.
64. Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 321 (3d Cir.
1982) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 706-08 n.41
(1979)).
65. See Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 318-20. "Section 602 and its implementing reg-
ulations were only relevant in Chowdhury to the extent that they, on their face,
afforded private plaintiffs a peripheral role in administrative proceedings."
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.
1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
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haustion [of administrative remedies]."' 66 Even more important to
the misconstruction in the district court's decision in Chester is the
Third Circuit's further observation in Chowdhury that "[a]s the
Supreme Court has noted, when there is a legal right without a
legal remedy, the right has little meaning" 67 and it is quite clear
"that Sections 602 and 603 are limits on agencies, and not on rights,
[which] is repeatedly made clear in the legislative proceedings."68
The absence of a role for private plaintiffs in pursuing a rem-
edy for a violation of their rights in the administrative proceeding is
an important reason for allowing at private right of action to pursue
relief elsewhere. The district court in Chester never addressed this
language of Chowdhury. It also never addressed the Third Circuit's
test for determining whether to imply a private right of action
under regulations validly promulgated pursuant to a statute. 69
In Chester, the Third Circuit clarified its earlier opinion in
Chowdhury by finding that "Chowdhury does not hold that no private
right of action exists under section 602 and its implementing regu-
lations. It merely indicates that the regulations themselves do not
expressly provide for a significant role for private parties [in fund
termination administrative proceedings] .... Chowdhury says noth-
ing about the appropriateness of implying a private right of ac-
tion."70 Thus, in Chester, the Third Circuit reversed the district court
because of its misinterpretation of Chowdhury.
Although the Third Circuit recognized a private cause of ac-
tion to enforce the EPA regulations in Chester, the Third Circuit
"decline[d] to hold that a private right of action exists based on
Guardians and Alexander alone."71 Instead, after deciding that their
own precedent did not answer the specific Title VI regulation right
of action question presented, the Third Circuit applied the three-
prong test 72 established in Angelastro, which it had later followed in
Polaroid Corp. v. Disney.73
66. Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 322 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 706-08 n.41) (ci-
tations omitted).
67. Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 321 (quoting NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc.,
599 F.2d 1247, 1254-55 (3d Cir. 1979) (footnotes and citations omitted)).
68. Chowdhury, 677 F.2d at 322.
69. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's test for determining whether a pri-
vate right of action exists, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
70. Chester, 132 F.3d at 932.
71. Id. at 931 (concluding that Alexander and Guardians do not themselves
answer the question whether private rights of action exist to enforce regulations
promulgated under Title VI).
72. See id. at 933.
73. For a discussion of the three-prong test established by Polaroid and Ange-
lastro, see infra note 98 and accompanying text. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Secs.,
1998] 333
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The Third Circuit is not the only appellate court to address the
general question of when to recognize a private right of action to
enforce regulations. In Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,74 the
Ninth Circuit adopted the following test:
The determination of whether a statute gives rise to an
implied right of action is "basically a matter of statutory
construction." In most cases, unlike the present case, the
task of statutory construction which leads to finding an im-
plied remedy will focus upon congressional intent. In
such cases, the implied remedy will also be read into the
accompanying administrative rule, in a straightforward
way, because an agency drafting rules pursuant to a statute
is restricted to the scope of authority granted by the legis-
lature. Therefore, if the rule in question is valid and furthers the
substantive purposes of the enabling statute, and the statute pro-
vides a private right of action as a matter of congressional intent,
we will imply the private right of action into the rule as well,
regardless of agency intent. To do otherwise might consti-
tute an unwarranted frustration of Congress' desire to sup-
plement agency action with private enforcement. 75
When Title VI disparate impact regulations are considered in
light of the Ninth Circuit test, the result is the same as under that of
the Third Circuit. The disparate impact regulations further the
substantive purposes of the enabling statute. The purposes of both
Inc. involved alleged misrepresentations and nondisclosures by a brokerage. See
764 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1985). The Third Circuit in Angelastro supported its
holding that rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission pur-
suant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 were privately enforceable, by
stating that "[w]here the enabling statute authorizes an implied right of action,
courts should permit private suits under agency rules within the scope of the en-
abling statue." Id. at 947. The Third Circuit did emphasize, however, that every
rule promulgated under a statute providing a private right of action will not auto-
matically carry with it such a right. See id. at 947-48. Accordingly, the Third Circuit
noted that the court must still follow a two-step inquiry of asking whether the stat-
ute implies a private right of action and whether this same implication should be
made for the rule at issue. See id.; see also Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d
1277, 1284-87 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that private right of action may be implied
in Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and inferred in regulations promul-
gated pursuant thereto); Oklahoma Nursing Home Ass'n v. Demps, 792 F. Supp.
721, 724-27 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (holding that Medicaid public notice regulation
could form basis for private cause of action under section 1983).
74. 749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding private right of action exists under
rules promulgated pursuant to Securities and Exchange Act).
75. Id. at 536 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-19 (1978) (relying on longstand-
ing judicial construction to imply private right of action under rules deemed rea-
sonably related to statutory purpose).
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sections 601 and 602 of Title V176 are consistent with the EPA dispa-
rate impact regulations. 77 Title VI also clearly provides for a private
right of action as a matter of congressional intent.78 As a result, the
Ninth Circuit would have no choice but to recognize a private cause
of action to enforce validly promulgated Tide VI regulations. In-
deed, a district court in the Ninth Circuit, applying the Robertson
test,79 reached this result in considering Title VI disparate impact
regulations. In Association of Mexican-American Educators v. Califor-
nia,80 the district court specifically held that there is a private right
of action to enforce such regulations and that a disparate impact
claim was, therefore, viable.8'
The Fifth Circuit is the only other court that has actually ad-
dressed the issue of a private right of action under civil rights regu-
lations analogous to those promulgated under Title VI. In analyzing
regulations that were promulgated pursuant to Title IX (which is
modeled on Tide VI), the Fifth Circuit used the Cort test, as used in
Cannon, but with slight modification. 82 In Lowrey v. Texas A & M
University System, 3 an athletic coordinator lost her position and was
denied the position of athletic director, in part, because the school
was allegedly retaliating against her for claiming that the school was
violating Title IX. 84 Regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX,
however, prohibited retaliation against persons who bring to light
or allege violations of Title IX.85 The Fifth Circuit in Lowrey stated
76. See Title VI § 601-602, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-1 (1994) (granting au-
thority to agencies to promulgate regulations protecting against discrimination).
77. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 592-93 n.14(1983) (stating Congress has consistently "rebuffed efforts to overturn the Title VI
disparate-impact regulations").
78. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-703 (1979) (stating
that "Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available
under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private
cause of action for victims of prohibited discrimination"). For a discussion of the
consistency between a private right of action and the congressional intent of Title
VI, see supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of the Robertson test, see supra notes 74-75 and accompa-
nying text.
80. 836 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (explaining weight of authority sup-
ports private right of action under Title VI).
81. See id. at 1548; see also Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala.
1998) (following Third Circuit's analysis in Chester).
82. For a discussion of the Cort test, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
83. 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) creates
implied private right of action for retaliation under Title IX).
84. See id. at 244.
85. See id. at 249-54 (observing that implied rights of action are available in
certain circumstances under Title IX); see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1, 100.7(e) (1997)
(stating that "Title IX incorporates by reference the antiretaliation provisions of
1998] 335
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the issue by noting that "[jlust as the Supreme Court has recog-
nized an implied right of action to vindicate the provisions of title
IX, Lowrey argues, this court likewise should recognize an implied
private right of action to vindicate the anti-retaliation provisions of
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e)." 6
The Fifth Circuit in Lowrey used a modified version of the Cort
test in determining whether to imply a private right of action to
enforce regulations that implement Title IX.8 7 First, the Fifth Cir-
cuit set forth the elements of the Cort test as follows:
(1) Is this plaintiff a member of the class for whose "espe-
cial" benefit the statute was enacted? In other words,
does the statute create a federal right for this
plaintiff?
(2) Is there any evidence of legislative intent, whether ex-
plicit or implicit, to create or deny a private remedy?
(3) Is it consistent with the legislative scheme to imply a
private remedy?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law so that implying a federal right of action
would be inappropriate?88
To answer the first prong, the Fifth Circuit modified the tradi-
tional analysis. Instead of looking to the words of the governing
statute, the Fifth Circuit looked to the words of the regulation and
held that "[t] he plain language of the regulations dictates the con-
clusion that Lowrey is an intended beneficiary of 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.7(e) and is a member of the special class for whom the regu-
lations were enacted."
8 9
The Fifth Circuit then analyzed the second prong of Cort by
considering whether Congress intended to create a private remedy
under the governing statute.90 After observing that the Supreme
Court had already ruled on this issue in Cannon, the Fifth Circuit
stated that "we see no principled basis upon which to distinguish
Title VI... which prohibits unlawful discrimination in programs receiving federal
assistance").
86. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 249-50.
87. See id. at 250-51 (applying the Cort test, as did the Cannon Court, in deter-
mining that private right of action for retaliation exists under Title IX
regulations).
88. Id. at 250.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 253.
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the implied private right of action recognized in Cannon... from
the implied private right of action at issue in the instant case .... 91
In addressing the third prong of Cort, the Fifth Circuit in Low-
rey further examined the Supreme Court's opinion in Cannon.
With respect to whether implying a private cause of action to en-
force the regulation would undermine the legislative scheme, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that, " [t] o the contrary, the implication of a
private right of action for retaliation would serve the dual purposes
of title IX, by creating an incentive for individuals to expose viola-
tions of title IX and by protecting such whistleblowers from retalia-
tion."92 The Fifth Circuit continued by stating that "[i] ndeed, the
Supreme Court has approved the implication of a private right of
action under title IX 'when that remedy is necessary or at least help-
ful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.' 93
The Fifth Circuit in Lowrey assumed that the fourth prong of
Cort was met. In fact, the Supreme Court said as much in Cannon,
when it noted that "[s] ince the Civil War, the Federal Government
and the federal courts have been the 'primary and powerful reli-
ances' in protecting citizens against such discrimination. '" 94
Applying Lowrey, it is clear that a private cause of action should
be recognized to enforce disparate impact regulations that imple-
ment Title VI. The first prong as to whether the plaintiff is a mem-
ber of the special class for whom the regulation has been enacted
appears satisfied on the face of the EPA regulation. This regulation
provides that "[a] recipient [of federal financial assistance] shall
not use criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, national origin, or sex.. .. "95 The second prong of
Lowrey has been recognized as being satisfied by Cannon and Guardi-
ans, in which the Court held that a private remedy is contemplated
under the governing statute. Satisfaction of the third prong like-
wise follows from Cannon. Cannon states that Title VI desired "to
accomplish two ... objectives. First, Congress wanted to avoid the
use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; sec-
ond, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection
91. Id.
92. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 254 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
94. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708.
95. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1997) (emphasis added).
1998]
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against those practices." 96 Thus, the underlying scheme or underly-
ing purposes behind Title VI would be furthered by recognizing a
private cause of action. Finally, according to the Third Circuit in
Chester, the fourth prong of Lowrey "is irrelevant because Title VI is
federal law."97
B. A Comparison: The Appellate Courts' Tests
By comparing the tests of the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, it
is apparent that common elements bind all three. The Third Cir-
cuit standard seems to be the most stringent and most difficult of
judicial application, containing more elements than the other two
circuits'. As noted, the Third Circuit sets forth the following three-
prong test to determine whether a private right of action exists:
(1) "[W]hether the agency rule is properly within the
scope of the enabling statute"; (2) "whether the statute
under which the agency rule was promulgated properly
permits the implication of a private right of action"; and
(3) "whether implying a private right of action will further
the purposes of the enabling statute."98
In addition, the Cort four-part analysis must be considered in ad-
dressing the Third Circuit's second prong.99 In Chester, the Third
Circuit agreed that " [i] n addressing the second [prong of the Third
Circuit test], a court will consider the factors set out by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. ... "100 Moreover, the Third Circuit's
three-prong test actually incorporates the modified Cort test as ar-
ticulated by the Fifth Circuit in Lowrey.1° 1 Therefore, for the plain-
tiff seeking to assert a private right of action in the Third Circuit,
there are many obstacles to overcome.
The Ninth Circuit test is the most straightforward, simplest in
application, and seemingly most consistent with the objective of giv-
ing meaning to regulatory rights. Beyond that, this test is the most
logical. Although on its face the test has three criteria, in fact the
96. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704; see also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W. 3129
(U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620).
97. Chester, 132 F.3d at 933 n.10.
98. Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 994 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Ange-
lastro v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1985)).
99. For a discussion of the four-part analysis as detailed by the Court in Cort,
see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
100. 132 F.3d at 933.
101. For a discussion of the modified Cort test as articulated by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, see supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
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test reduces to two, namely, whether the regulation is valid, and
whether the regulation furthers the substantive purposes of the en-
abling statute. 10 2 This reduction is because the question of imply-
ing a right of action under a regulation will arise only if the Ninth
Circuit's third criterion, whether the enabling statute implies a
right of action as a matter of congressional intent, has already been
satisfied. 10 3 Additionally, although many of the elements consid-
ered in the Third and Fifth Circuits' tests will also be considered
within the Ninth Circuit's test, the Ninth Circuit's test is simple to
administer and whether the test has been satisfied is relatively easily
ascertainable. 104
C. Appellate Courts in Practice: Most Appellate Courts Have
Assumed There Is an Implied Private Right of Action
Under Title VI Regulations
Many courts have assumed that a private right of action exists
without directly deciding the issue. It is not surprising, therefore,
that five Circuit Courts of Appeals have recognized that Guardians
allows for a private cause of action based on regulations implement-
ing section 601 of Title VI. 10 5 In Villanueva v. Carere,10 6 private liti-
gants, a class of Latino-American parents and children, brought an
action to enjoin the closure of two schools. 10 7 The Tenth Circuit,
while interpreting Guardians, stated that "[a]lthough Title VI itself
proscribes only intentional discrimination, certain regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI prohibit actions that have a dispa-
rate impact on groups protected by the act, even in the absence of
102. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's Robertson test, see supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the application of the Ninth Circuit's Robertson test,
see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
104. For a discussion of the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits' tests to deter-
mine whether a private right of action exists, see supra notes 98-103 and accompa-
nying text.
105. Regulations implementing section 601 of Tide VI are promulgated pur-
suant to section 602 of Tide VI. For the text of sections 601 and 602 of Tide VI,
see supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. The longstanding practice of the
courts recognizing a private right of action to enforce Tide VI and Title IX regula-
tions has not resulted in a flood of litigation. Indeed, as the cases in this section of
the Article demonstrate, recognition of a right of action does not necessarily result
in success on the merits of a case.
106. 85 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996).
107. See id. at 482. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit held that the private litigants
failed to show discriminatory intent in the school board's decision to close neigh-
borhood schools and open charter schools. See id. at 486. Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit held that the private litigants failed to show discriminatory impact on His-
panic students as a result of the closings. See id. at 486-87.
1998] 339
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discriminatory intent."10 8
Similarly, in Roberts v. Colorado State Board of Agriculture,10 9 pri-
vate litigants were successful in obtaining an injunction under Tide
IX, reinstating a state university softball team.1 10 There, the Tenth
Circuit stated in dictum that the administrative regulations incorpo-
rating a disparate impact standard were valid, 111 ultimately conclud-
ing that "the district court did not err here in failing to require
proof of discriminatory intent."1 1 2 Thus, it is apparent that the
Tenth Circuit permits private litigants to enforce regulations imple-
menting Tide VI by proving disparate impact.
In New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 113 the Second Cir-
cuit recognized a private cause of action under regulations imple-
menting Tide VI. 114 Private litigants brought an action to enforce a
United States Department of Transportation regulation promul-
gated pursuant to Title VI.115 There, the Second Circuit implicitly
recognized a private right of action by allowing plaintiffs to "make a
prima facie showing that the alleged conduct has a disparate im-
pact" to shift the burden of proof to the funding recipient. 116
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has made the same assump-
108. Id. at 486 (citing Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
584 n.2 (1983)).
109. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
110. See id. at 826. Roberts involved Colorado State University students and
former members of the University's fast pitch softball team who brought individual
actions after the University and the State Board of Agriculture discontinued the
varsity fast pitch softball program. See id. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that
the defendants violated Title IX. See id. The district court found that the defend-
ants had violated Title IX and ordered an injunction reinstating the softball pro-
gram. See id.
111. See id. at 832 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2). Specifically, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the "[d]efendants neglect[ed] to consider the additional
holding of Guardians, that 'although Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory
intent, the administrative regulations [under Title VI] incorporating a disparate-
impact standard are valid.'" Id.
112. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 833.
113. 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
114. See id. at 1035. Although the Second Circuit recognized the cause of
action, it held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction under Title VI
to stop the transportation authority from increasing city transportation rates. See
id. at 1040.
115. See id. at 1033-34. The regulation provided, in pertinent part:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial aid, or other
benefits, or facilities which will be provided under any such program...
may not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
persons to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin
Id. at 1036 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 21.5 (b)(2) (1996)).
116. New York Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036. The Second Circuit concluded
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tion as other circuits. In Chicago v. Lindley, aa7 the City of Chicago
challenged the distribution of funds within a program administered
under Title VI, basing its challenge on a regulation stating that a
federal funds recipient may not redistribute the funds in ways that
"have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, or national origin."118 After citing Guardians
and Alexander, the Seventh Circuit considered the disparate impact
claim, 119 ultimately concluding that "the City's challenges do not
have a disparate impact on the State's minority older individuals
.... "120 Additionally, in David K. v. Lane,121 private litigants sought
to enjoin a prison policy concerning gang membership.' 22
Although the case was dismissed on other grounds, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stated:
It is clear that plaintiffs may maintain a private cause of
action to enforce the regulations promulgated under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act .... Moreover, plaintiffs need
not show intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail on
a claim brought under these administrative regulations.
Evidence of a discriminatory effect is sufficient. 1
23
The Seventh Circuit again assumed the existence of a plaintiffs
right to make a prima facie showing of disparate impact. These two
decisions are consistent with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Gomez
v. Illinois State Board of Education.124 In Gomez, private litigants, a
group of bilingual children, brought an action seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief. 125 There, the Seventh Circuit held "that the
portion of plaintiffs' Title VI claim based on the implementing reg-
that claims under Title VI regulations must follow the burden shifting guidelines
established in Title VII disparate impact cases. See id. at 1037.
117. 66 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that cities could not challenge
Department of Aging distribution formula in section 1983 action).
118. Id. at 827. This regulation was nearly identical to the EPA's civil rights
regulation at issue in Chester. For the text of the Chester regulation, see supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
119. See id. at 828-30 (holding that disparate impact claim was without merit).
120. Id. at 830.
121. 839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988).
122. See id. at 1267-68. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that the prison
inmates' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights were not violated by reg-
ulations limiting gang activity. See id. at 1273-74.
123. Id. at 1274 (citations omitted).
124. 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987).
125. See id. at 1034. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district had violated
the Equal Educational Opportunities Act by failing to test them for English lan-
guage proficiency, and had not provided bilingual instruction or compensatory
instruction. See id. at 1032-33.
19981
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ulations survives the defendant's 12(b) (6) challenge, even though
there was no allegation in the complaint that the defendants acted
with discriminatory intent."126
Similarly, in Castaneda v. Pickard,127 the Fifth Circuit addressed
a claim brought by Mexican-Americans alleging intentional discrim-
ination in the practice of hiring teachers. 128 There, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that because of the Guardians decision, "a Title VI action
can now be maintained ... in the guise of a disparate impact case,
involving employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on
one group than another."129 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
"[t] he plaintiff must show that 'a facially neutral employment prac-
tice has the result of producing a significantly adverse impact on
one race."'
130
The Eleventh Circuit also has determined that regulations
promulgated pursuant to Title VI permit a private cause of action
based on a disparate impact claim. In Georgia State Conference of
Branches of NAACP v. Georgia,13' private litigants, African-American
schoolchildren, alleged violations of the regulations implementing
Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act.132 After finding that Guardians
validated regulations using a disparate impact standard, 133 the Elev-
enth Circuit stated that "[t] here is no doubt that the plaintiffs pred-
icated this cause of action on the regulations. As a result, the
district court correctly applied disparate impact analysis to their Ti-
tle VI claim."'13 4
The First Circuit continued this interpretive trend in Cohen v.
Brown University,13 5 where it construed a regulation implementing
126. Id. at 1045; cf Craft v. Board of Trustees, 793 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (holding proof of discriminatory intent was essential element of
claim that medical opportunity program at university's college of medicine vio-
lated statutory prohibition against exclusion from federally assisted program on
ground of race, color, or national origin, and, in absence of such proof, award of
compensatory damages was not warranted).
127. 781 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1986).
128. See id.
129. Id. at 465 n.11.
130. Id. (quoting Page v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.
1984)).
131. 775 F.2d 1403 (l1th Cir. 1985).
132. See id. at 1407-08 (addressing claim that African-American students were
assigned to regular classes and special education programs in certain school dis-
tricts in a discriminatory manner).
133. See id. at 1417.
134. Id. at 1417 (footnote omitted).
135. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). In Cohen, members of Brown University's
gymnastics and volleyball teams brought an action alleging Title IX violations. See
22
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Title IX, a parallel civil rights statute.1 3 6 The regulation read that
"[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from an-
other person or otherwise be discriminated against in any
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered
by a recipient. '" 137 Basing its decision on this regulation, the First
Circuit found in favor of the private litigants. 138 Relying on Can-
non, the First Circuit concluded that Title IX and Title VI are to be
interpreted similarly because Title IX is nearly identical to Title VI
except for the substitution of the word "sex" for the phrase "race,
color, or national origin," and, moreover, both statutes use the
same administrative mechanism.139 The First Circuit found that the
three-prong test incorporated in the regulation was valid and noted
that "[w]hile any single element of this tripartite test, in isolation,
might not achieve the goal set by the statute, the test as a whole is
reasonably constructed to implement the statute."140 Therefore, in-
terpretations of regulations implementing Title IX are relevant to
the interpretation of Title VI as to whether a private cause of action
should be recognized under the regulations.
Clearly, civil rights have been protected through private en-
forcement of regulations promulgated pursuant to civil rights stat-
utes. Thus far, courts have acknowledged the existence of private
rights of action under both Title VI and Title IX regulations. Such
acknowledgment is principled and essential to the full protection of
rights such regulations validly confer.
id. at 892. The First Circuit ordered an injunction against demotion of their sports
from varsity teams to club teams. See id. at 893.
136. See id. at 896.
137. Id. at 895-96 n.8 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a) (1992)).
138. See id. at 899-91.
139. See id. at 893-900. The Court observed in Cannon "[tlhat the drafters of
Title IX explicitly assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had
been during the preceding eight years." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 696 (1979). The Court further stated:
In 1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had
already been construed as creating a private remedy . . . . It is always
appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citi-
zens, know the law; in this case, because of their repeated references to
Title VI and its modes of enforcement, we are especially justified in
presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior inter-
pretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with
respect to Title IX.
Id. at 696-98.
140. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 900 (lst Cir. 1993).
1998]
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V. CONCLUSION: A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY Is No
RIGHT AT ALL
Justice Marshall, while dissenting in Guardians, wrote that "[a]
right without an effective remedy has little meaning. 141 In Chester
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania argued that the disparate im-
pact EPA regulations were not enforceable by private parties, but
only by EPA in administrative funding termination proceedings. 142
Indeed, the district court essentially agreed with the Common-
wealth's argument. 143 Where rights are created in favor of a class,
however, requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
appropriate when those remedies consist only of filing a grievance
with the agency.144 If the court of appeals' decision had been re-
versed, the mere filing of a grievance is precisely what the Chester
Residents' remedy would have been. 145
141. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 626 (1983) (Mar-
shallJ., dissenting) (arguing that denying compensatory relief under Title VI frus-
trates its fundamental purpose); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
166 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating "[b]ut where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend on the performance of that duty, it seems equally
clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy").
142. See Brief for Appellees at 19-22, Chester Residents Concerned for Quality
Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 97-1125).
143. See Chester Residents Concerned For Quality Living v. Sef, 944 F. Supp.
413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd, 132 F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated as moot, 67 U.S.L.W.
3129 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1998) (No. 97-1620). Specifically, the district court stated:
We agree with defendant that "[p]laintiffs would have this court turn the
holdings of Medical Center and Chowdhury - which found a private right
of action under section 601 because of a complainant's limited role
under Section 602 regulations - on their head[s] and hold that because
there is a private right of action under Section 601 there is also such a
right under regulations promulgated to Section 602." We decline plain-
tiffs' invitation to engage in this sort of judicial gymnastics in the face of
what we regard as controlling authority.
Id. at 417 (citations omitted). Thereafter, the district court found that "there is no
private cause of action under the EPA civil rights regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to § 602 of Title VI." Id.
144. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-05 (1979). In
Cannon, the Supreme Court stated:
Title IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accomplish two related, but
nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress wanted to
avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; sec-
ond, it wanted to provide citizens effective protection against those prac-
tices .... The first purpose is generally served by the statutory procedure
for the termination of federal financial support for institutions engaged
in discriminatory practices. That remedy is, however, severe and often
may not provide an appropriate means of accomplishing the second pur-
pose if merely an isolated violation has occurred.
Id. (footnote omitted).
145. The Supreme Court's vacatur of the Third Circuit'sjudgment should not
be construed as a decision on the merits. It was based on mootness and, therefore,
24
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In the Supreme Court's decision of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,146
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the nature of rights created by
regulations by stating that "[w] e described a substantive rule - or a
'legislative-type rule,'.. . as one 'affecting individual rights and obli-
gations'.... This characteristic is an important touchstone for dis-
tinguishing those rules that may be 'binding' or have the 'force of
law."'147 For example, defendants in Chester were required to sign
an agreement stating that EPA's civil rights regulations implement-
ing an "effects test" would be complied with as a condition of receiv-
ing federal financial assistance. Therefore, the state incurred a
"binding obligation" by contract as well as by regulation. Regula-
means merely that a "case or controversy" no longer existed for the Court to adju-
dicate. A misapprehension of the result in Chester is apparent from the colloquy
between counsel and the court in South Bronx Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy,
with most unfortunate consequences. See (No. 98-4404), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13978, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1998).
146. 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (holding agency's rule allowing private right of ac-
tion was impermissible because "Trade Secrets Act does not afford a private right
of action").
147. Id. at 302. In Chrysler, the Court explained how a regulation would have
the "force and effect of law," by stating:
In order for a regulation to have the 'force and effect of law,' it must be a
'substantive' or 'legislative-type' rule affecting individual rights and obli-
gations and it must be the product of a congressional grant of legislative
authority, promulgated in conformity with any procedural requirements
imposed by Congress.
Id. at 302. Disparate impact regulations implementing Title VI were held consis-
tent with the congressional grant of legislative authority to the agencies in Guardi-
ans and Alexander. Therefore, it is clearly established that regulations can have the
force of law and can create fights in persons.
The Court in Chrysler also defined substantive rules which give rise to rights, by
contrasting them with interpretive rules as follows:
In prior cases, we have given some weight to the Attorney General's Man-
ual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947), since the Justice Depart-
ment was heavily involved in the legislative process that resulted in the
Act's enactment in 1946 .... The Manual refers to substantive rules as
rules that "implement" the statute. "Such rules have the force and effect
of law." In contrast it suggests that "interpretive rules" and "general state-
ments of policy" do not have the force and effect of law. Interpretive
rules are "issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's con-
struction of the statutes and rules which it administers." General state-
ments of policy are "statements issued by an agency to advise the public
prospectively of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a
discretionary power."
Id. at 302 n.31 (citations omitted). EPA civil rights regulations implement Title VI.
Also, the regulations were clearly intended to be mandatory for the funding recipi-
ents and not merely advisory to the public. Moreover, these regulations are "sub-
stantive," affect the rights of individuals, and impose obligations on the recipients
of federal funds to end disparate impact discrimination against those who are af-
fected by their programs. Through section 602 of Tide VI, Congress explicitly au-
thorized federal agencies to promulgate regulations to implement the statute.
1998]
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tions can clearly create rights in persons. 148 These are rights, cre-
ated by regulations, held by persons of color who are disparately
impacted by the state program.
But, where rights are created there must be an effective rem-
edy. The Supreme Court recognized this in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,149 when it stated "'where
federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
so as to grant the necessary relief.""' 150 One way to protect these
rights is for EPA to institute funding termination for the state pro-
gram involved in the violation. However, the Supreme Court, in
Cannon, went to great lengths to explain that the administrative
process is not an effective remedy to redress violations of such
rights.151 Specifically, the Supreme Court stated the following:
[T]he complaint procedure ... does not allow the com-
plainant to participate in the investigation or subsequent
enforcement proceedings. Moreover, even if those pro-
ceedings result in a finding of a violation, a resulting vol-
untary compliance agreement need not include relief for
the complainant .... Furthermore, the agency may sim-
ply decide not to investigate a decision that will often be
based on enforcement resources, rather than on any con-
clusion on the merits of the complaint .... Because the
individual complainants cannot assure themselves that the
administrative process will reach a decision on their com-
plaints within a reasonable time, it makes little sense to
require exhaustion. 52
If regulations create rights in persons, yet the administrative
process is not an effective way to remedy a violation of those rights,
then it is essential that the victims of such violations be able to bring
a private suit to obtain a remedy. Limiting victims' remedies to the
administrative procedure would frustrate their own attempts to vin-
148. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 613 (1979)
(stating that "[i]n that sense all federal rights, whether created by treaty, by statute,
or by regulation, are 'secured' by the Supremacy Clause").
149. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that individual stated claim to enforce
Fourth Amendment).
150. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (footnote
omitted)).
151. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 707-08 (1979).
152. Id.; see also Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 321-
22 (3d Cir. 1982).
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dicate their rights. 153
An implied private right of action clearly should be recognized
to enforce civil rights regulations promulgated pursuant to statutes
that are privately enforceable. In the context of statutes like Title
IX and Title VI, where the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized
an implied cause of action to enforce the statute and held that dis-
parate impact regulations are valid, it would frustrate the intent of
Congress not to allow private plaintiffs redress for harm that they
have suffered. It is clear that there is a need for "private attorneys
general" to ensure that our civil rights laws are obeyed. Environ-
mental justice is one of many worthy objectives that will be ad-
vanced by the recognition of private rights of action under civil
rights statutes. Perhaps too slowly, but nevertheless surely, we are
making progress toward that end.
153. See generally Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 405 (1970) (subjecting to judicial
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